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ABSTRACT
Attribute-based credentials (ABCs) are building blocks for
user-centric identity management. They enable the disclo-
sure of a minimum amount of information about their owner
to a verifier, typically a service provider, to authorise the
credential owner for some service, application, or resource.
By directly applying attribute-disclosure protocols, the
data is revealed not only to the verifier, but anyone who
has access to the communication channel. Moreover, as ver-
ifiers are not intrinsically authenticated, one can accidentally
reveal attributes to the wrong party. Therefore, a secure
channel has to be established between the prover and the
verifier.
Although efficient ABC smart-card implementations exist,
not always can they perform all prover features. An equality
proof, for instance, is essential in creating pseudonyms that
enable temporary identification and eventually establishing
a channel. Without this feature, other techniques have to
be developed. In this paper we apply a more general notion
of authentication that does not require card identification
or pseudonyms. Based on this concept, we propose a secu-
rity model that includes mutual authentication and setting
up a channel between a card and a verifier. We present
two efficient and provably secure protocols under standard
assumptions in the random oracle model.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and Protection; K.6.5 [Management of Com-
puting and Information Systems]: Security and Pro-
tection—Authentication; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]:
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1. INTRODUCTION
As individuals perform an increasing amount of transac-
tions online, privacy is of primary importance in the dig-
ital world. For many of these transactions, for instance,
the full identity of a user is not essential, only a few non-
identifying attributes are sufficient to be revealed (e.g., “over
18” for buying alcoholic drinks). Traditionally, authentica-
tion means the process of proving the ownership of one’s
identity. A more general notion of authentication is the pro-
cess of proving that certain predicates, or attributes, hold
for an entity.
Attribute-based credentials [5, 8, 7] make it possible to
perform such proofs. An attribute-based credential (ABC),
a cryptographic container of attributes related to an indi-
vidual, is signed by an authoritative issuer that attests to
these attributes. As attributes in an ABC can be shown
independently of one another, its owner can adaptively use
them in different applications. These proofs are called selec-
tive disclosure proofs. Moreover, each instance of showing
an ABC looks unrelated to other instances and also to the
issuing of this credential.
A tamper-resistant, personal smart card is a viable choice
to carry ABCs. Several studies (e.g., [3, 12, 15]) show that
the most essential functionalities are feasible to implement
on currently available smart cards. However, not all features
can be implemented on these resource-limited devices. Due
to their complexity, proofs of equality of attributes in sepa-
rate credentials or property proofs about attributes (like, an
attribute lies in an interval or is an element of a set) require
more memory (RAM) than available on some—otherwise
suitable—platforms. This work is motivated by the IRMA
project1, in which users’ smart cards cannot run equality or
property proofs.
A verifier is allowed to access only those attributes from
a card that are necessary for the authorisation. This is de-
scribed by an access policy that is included in a public-key
certificate provided to each verifier. Therefore, when a ver-
ifier and a card start communicating, the verifier sends its
1IRMA stands for ‘I Reveal My Attributes’. The
IRMA project is based on an efficient smart-card im-
plementation of Idemix [15]. For more information, see
https://www.irmacard.org.
certificate and the card checks its access rights and adheres
only to allowed attribute queries later.
A secure channel is essential for ABC proofs since a selec-
tive disclosure protocol requires protection of a card-holder’s
privacy against an eavesdropping adversary for different rea-
sons.
• Disclosed attributes: Obviously, confidentiality should
be provided for personal data during the authentica-
tion process; e.g., identifying attributes.
• Verifier’s request: Attribute requests may reveal in-
formation about provided services; e.g., if a service
provider asks for “over 18”, it may leak information
about the sort of movie a user watches.
• Issuer’s signature: Information about the credential
issuer may give hints about the type of credentials
and/or the values of attribute; e.g., the signature of
a credential issued by an employer reveals where an
individual works.
Not only eavesdropping, but also active attacks can threaten
system security. First, when proofs are not linked to each
other, which is the case in smart-card protocols due to re-
source constraints, a verifier cannot be assured that they
are originating from the same device. For instance, a mem-
bership attribute on one card could be combined with an
“over 18”attribute on another card. A secure channel that is
bound to one device on the prover’s side can prevent this, so-
called card-pooling attack. Second, without a secure chan-
nel, a classical man-in-the-middle attack can be set up. For
instance, acting as a card and using proofs from a real card,
a rogue verifier could access some service at another veri-
fier. The same adversary could also inject proofs from other
devices that affect the authorisation decision of the verifier.
A secure channel provides additionally the benefit of a ses-
sion that can link verification of (potentially non-identifying)
attributes from already existing credentials on a card and
the issuance of new ones. This sort of issuing procedure,
in which new credentials rely on non-identifying attributes,
is also in line with the original notion of an (anonymous)
credential [9].
To establish a channel with a verifier, a card cannot re-
veal a unique, card-specific identifier as it would destroy the
privacy properties of the ABC technology. Hence, a new no-
tion of validity is required to realise authentication. A card
is regarded as valid (or authentic) if it holds a particular
credential and thus it can perform a proof about it. For ex-
ample, a national identity card would be considered as such
if it can prove that it carries an attribute-based credential
issued by the state authority responsible for electronic iden-
tity cards.
Throughout this paper individuals are assumed to hold
personal cards used to disclose relevant attributes in order
to access some service. Each card carries attribute-based
credentials and a root credential [1] which, by an empty
proof, shows validity of the card. This paper introduces
a security model and proposes two protocols that realise
items 1a, 1b, and optionally 3b in the following list of steps
in the context of ABCs:
1. Authentication
(a) Establishing an authenticated secure channel
(b) Selective disclosure within the channel
2. Authorisation decision based on selectively disclosed
information
3. Accessing service
(a) Resource, application; or
(b) [Optional] Credential issuance within the channel
1.1 Attribute-Based Credentials
An attribute-based credential is a cryptographic container
for attributes represented as bit-strings. A credential is
signed by an issuer using some special signature that pro-
vides the following functionalities.
• A zero-knowledge proof can be produced by the holder
of the credential that reveals any desired subset of the
attributes along with the issuer’s signature and a proof
that the disclosed attributes are actually in the creden-
tial. This mechanism is called a selective disclosure, or
simply a verification protocol.
• Verification instances carried out using a credential are
unlinkable, unless attributes make them linkable.
• A verification instance is also unlinkable to the is-
suance of the credential.
As a result, individuals, using attribute-based credentials,
can prove a minimum amount of information about them-
selves. The two most important technologies that realise
attribute-based credentials are Microsoft’s U-Prove [5, 4]
and IBM’s Idemix [8, 14], which are being put in a unified
architecture by the European ABC4Trust project [7].
A selective disclosure is a proof protocol that starts with
the verifier’s request for certain attributes and it includes
a fresh, random nonce n. As a response, the revealed at-
tributes and the credential or its randomised version are
transmitted together with a non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) proof. This proof is also a signature on the nonce,
which demonstrates freshness; e.g., no replay attack is pos-
sible. The following simple notation is introduced for the
NIZK proof that the card provides:
SD ((ai)i∈D;n) ,
where D is the set of indices i corresponding to attribute
i in a given credential and n is the message/nonce to be
signed. We implicitly assume that in an implementation the
message also contains a unique description of the context of
the protocol run, like n‖context; this will be omitted from
now on. A selective disclosure is called an empty proof if no
attribute is revealed (i.e., D = ∅), only the mere existence
of a credential is proven. Note that during selective disclo-
sure proofs the identity of the credential issuers are revealed
just like that of a certificate authority in case of public-key
certificates.
An optional ABC functionality is an equality proof to show
the equality of two secret values. Roughly speaking, such a
zero-knowledge proof requires two times as much working
memory (i.e., RAM). If equality proofs are not feasible in
a particular card implementation, in order for a set of at-
tributes residing in different credentials to be proven, one
has to perform as many selective disclosure proofs as the
number of distinct credentials involved. (Otherwise, proofs
of equality of the non-disclosed master secret key are re-
quired.)
Since during verifications users do not necessarily reveal
identifying attributes, revocation is especially challenging.
Lapon et al. [11] give a comprehensive theoretical and prac-
tical comparison of different techniques to revoke ABCs that
achieve anonymity and revocability simultaneously.
1.2 Authenticated Secure Channel
Although many authentication and key-exchange proto-
cols have been proposed at a very early stage of cryptog-
raphy, Bellare and Rogaway [2] are the first who studied
authenticated key exchange rigorously in a cryptographic
sense.
In [2] participants are de-coupled and all communication is
controlled by an active adversary. To show security of an au-
thentication protocol, one has to prove that the probability
for this adversary to make participants accept the other’s
authenticity is negligible unless all messages are conveyed
according to the protocol. The main tool to capture this
notion is the so-called matching conversation. By attach-
ing some extra information to the mutual authentication
protocol, the authors achieve efficient and provably secure
key-exchange protocols. The adversary is so powerful that
she can query all secret session information from any partic-
ipant. The security of a key exchange protocol is defined as
the indistinguishability of a fresh (not queried) session key
from a random string.
Our security model builds on [2], and it incorporates asym-
metric and attribute-based authentication.
1.3 Related Techniques
A pseudonym [9, 8] is bound to a user’s credentials, but it
does not reveal anything about credential keys or the user’s
identity. A pseudonym is similar to a public key within a
proof session, but there are practically an infinite number
of pseudonyms corresponding to a secret key, which allow
for unlinkability among separate sessions or contexts. Ap-
plying pseudonyms however requires equality proofs, that is,
zero-knowledge proofs that the same secret key α was used
to generate the pseudonym and verification proofs. In our
model this is not considered to be feasible.
The German e-identity project [13] provides privacy-friend-
ly proofs for citizens based on attributes, such as “over 18”
age proofs. However, it employs a different approach from
ABCs to achieve anonymity for particular identity cards.
Each card has a public key (so-called chip authentication
key) that enables authentication or channel establishment.
A public key is not assigned to a single card, but a batch of
cards. Therefore, batches can be identified, but not cards
(or card holders). In practice, an appropriate batch size has
to be determined. To achieve a proper level of anonymity,
batches should not be too small. On the other hand, too
big batch sizes result in infrastructural problems. In case of
a card with a corresponding private key gets compromised,
not only this particular card has to be revoked, but all cards
of its batch.
The CAID and CAKE (credential-authenticated identifi-
cation and key exchange) protocols [6] are introduced for
authentication and key exchange using credentials. These
protocols are proven to be secure in the universal compos-
ability framework. Although the motivation and the results
closely related to ours, the present study assumes minimum
about the resources of users’ devices (e.g., very simple pol-
icy), and there is no equality proof of attributes, in particu-
lar.
1.4 Our Contributions
In this paper we elaborate on ABC authentication within
a secure channel. We propose to adapt the security model
of [2] to ABC systems in which the prover’s resources are
very limited and the user is identified only to the extent of
the attribute proofs included. We put forward two protocols
and briefly discuss their security in the introduced model.
Both protocols are practical and efficient in the sense that
the computation and working memory overhead are much
less than (or, in the case of the second protocol, comparable
to) the resources ABC proofs require.
2. SECURE ABC CHANNELS
2.1 Security Model
In order to set up a secure channel for selective disclo-
sure, a card and a verifier have to mutually authenticate
each other. However, since being “valid” is different at an
anonymous card and a legitimate verifier, authentication has
to be defined on both sides separately. A card is considered
to be valid if it can carry out a whole verification protocol
that includes an empty (selective disclosure) proof of the
root credential. A verifier on the other hand has to show a
valid public-key certificate and prove knowledge of the cor-
responding secret key.
In this model, sessions of cards and verifiers are mod-
elled as oracles that follow the protocol. The adversary is
a polynomial-time algorithm that controls the whole com-
munication among oracles. The adversary’s goal is to win
one of two games, i.e., to break one of the following two
security properties of the system. First, it can try to eaves-
drop on revealed but encrypted attributes thus compromis-
ing confidentiality. This is captured by the notion of indis-
tinguishability of a session key and a random string. Second,
the adversary can forge fake authentication by convincing a
party that it is “talking” to a valid counter-party while this
is not the case. This is captured by the unfeasibility of coun-
terfeiting matching conversations. If an adversary has only
negligible advantage in both games, the protocol is a secure
ABC session protocol . Furthermore, a revocation mechanism
will be considered to be ideal if any card corruption results
in immediate card revocation.2
2.2 Implicit Card Authentication
We introduce an efficient ABC session protocol in Fig-
ure 1, which is called the implicit card authentication pro-
tocol or ICA. The verifier and a presumed card establish a
key k that is used to provide a secure channel based on k for
the selective disclosure proofs. Note that unlike most au-
thenticated key exchange protocols, the card’s validity can
only be verified within the channel, which explains the name
of this protocol.
We assume that the verifier’s public key is an initial in-
put value to the card. Moreover, the card is also privy to
the description of which attributes this verifier is eligible to
request. In practice, a public-key certificate is sent to the
card, from which it can extract and verify pkV and attribute
access rights. The verifier’s private initial input is its secret
key skV .
2A complete description of the security model and the full
proofs of the protocols will appear in an extended version of
this paper.
CCard (pkV )
V
Verifier (skV )
1. nV
2. EpkV (nC)
seed = nV ‖nC seed = nV ‖nC
k = f1(seed) k = f1(seed)
3. Enck(OK)
4. n, request attributes
N = f2(n ‖ seed) N = f2(n ‖ seed)
5. attributes, SD (. . . ;N)
Verify
new proof
Secure channel (k)
Figure 1: Implicit card authentication ICA: A key
exchange for selective disclosure precedes card au-
thentication.
A verifier initiates the protocol ICA by sending a ran-
dom nonce nV chosen uniformly at random from the nonce
space. Then, the card also generates a random nonce nC
from the same nonce space. It encrypts nC using the public
key pkV and sends EpkV (nC) to the verifier. After receiv-
ing EpkV (nC), the verifier can decrypt it and compute nC .
Both participants can now compute and store seed and the
channel key k = f1(seed). However, only the verifier has
already authenticated by being required to know its private
key. Applying explicit key confirmation, the verifier sends
flow 3. Enck(OK), an OK message encrypted (by authenti-
cated encryption) using the freshly established key k. The
card checks it to get convinced that they share the same key
(KeyOK) and that it indeed communicates with the intended
verifier (Accept).
Within the established secure channel the two parties per-
form the selective disclosure proofs that eventually provide
card authenticity. To initiate each selective disclosure, the
verifier sends a fresh, random nonce n and requests some
attributes to be disclosed. A verifier only requests a set of
attributes that reside in one credential since cards are not
assumed to be able to link proofs from different credentials.
The card checks that the verifier is entitled to request these
attributes. If not, the card rejects the request. Otherwise,
it computes N = f2(n‖seed) and using it as a fresh nonce,
the card generates a non-interactive selective disclosure that
reveals the requested attributes and proves that they reside
in the credential. The verifier checks the proof using N and
stores the disclosed attributes. After all credential proofs
with the required attributes were requested and performed
successfully, the verifier terminates and outputs Accept and
a set A of revealed and verified attributes.
Theorem 1. Assume that a CPA-secure public-key en-
cryption (Gpke, E ,D) is given to encrypt confidential mes-
sages to verifiers, a secure ABC technology is given for se-
lective attribute disclosure with ideal revocation, and an au-
thenticated encryption Enck(·) is given for secure channels
with arbitrary keys from the key space. Moreover, let f1, f2
be random oracles with all participants (including the adver-
sary) having access to them. Then the implicit card authen-
tication protocol ICA is a secure ABC session protocol.
Proof sketch. Clearly, two parties following the proto-
col can both Accept under a benign adversary. Furthermore,
the verifier receives all eligibly requested attributes that it
can output at the end of the protocol.
1. The subprotocol ICAkey that establishes a key by the
first two flows is confidential; that is, seeing only the
message flows, an adversary cannot distinguish the re-
sulting key k from a random string of the same length.
If flow 3. is omitted, ICA is also confidential. (With-
out the omission of the explicit key confirmation, an
adversary would trivially win.)
2. The nonce transformation f2(n‖seed) in the secure
channel cannot be existentially forged without know-
ing both the nonce n and the seed. This provides
freshness and binds the key exchange to the selective
disclosure proofs.
3. It is impossible to combine selective disclosure proofs
coming from combined sources, that is, both from cor-
rupted and uncorrupted cards.
4. Since without a valid credential it is impossible to forge
a proof (relying on the ABC technology) and thus to
produce a matching conversation, an adversary can ei-
ther authenticate using exactly one uncorrupted card
(benign adversary) or using only corrupted cards. As-
suming that an ideal revocation is provided, the pro-
tocol is authentic.
Being confidential and authentic, ICA is a secure ABC ses-
sion protocol.
Note that we proposed to use a root credential that is
only issued to valid cards after a rigorous verification pro-
cedure. The presence of such a credential, which can be
demonstrated using an empty proof, shows that a card is
valid. However, since ABC proofs are rather expensive in
terms of time [3, 12, 15], it is often desirable to omit as
many selective disclosure proofs as possible in practice. In
a slightly modified trust model, verifiers may rely on issuers
to verify properly the root credential before they issue a new
ABC. In this case verifiers do not need to request a separate
validity proof. This is a decision that the given system man-
ager and/or a particular verifier can decide upon. Needless
to say, if the verification aims at a service of issuing new
credentials on a particular card, card validity should be ver-
ified and issuance should be carried out in the same secure
channel as the verification.
2.3 An ABC Channel with DH Key Exchange
Although ICA is an efficient protocol to build a secure
channel for ABC proofs, in some applications it might be
desirable to make an explicit authentic key establishment.
Furthermore, the roles of a verifier and a card is very differ-
ent in ICA, while in future scenarios participants may be
provers and verifiers simultaneously. We propose a protocol
that addresses these issues.
To construct a new protocol, we will employ two tech-
niques. First, we define a new type of public-key certificate
based on ABCs. Second, in order for the two parties to
set up a session key, they use authenticated Diffie–Hellman
CCard
V
Verifier
xV , hV = g
xV (mod p)
σV = SD (. . . ; f1(hV ))
1. hV , σV
xC , hC = g
xC (mod p)
σC = SD (. . . ; f1(hV ‖hC))
2. hC , σC
seed = hxCV seed = h
xV
C
k = f2(seed) k = f2(seed)
3. Enck(0x00‖OK)
4. Enck(0x01‖OK)
Diffie–Hellman
5. n, request attributes
N = f3(n ‖ seed) N = f3(n ‖ seed)
6. attributes, SD (. . . ;N)
new proof
Selective disclosure
Figure 2: ABCDH protocol: Explicit ABC authen-
tication and the Diffie–Hellman key exchange for se-
lective disclosure.
(DH) key exchange. Both parties will authenticate using
zero-knowledge proofs.
As mentioned above, we define an attribute-based public-
key credential (ABPKC). A certificate authority issues AB-
PKCs that contain the verifier’s identifier, public key and
the access rights to particular attributes in ABCs that the
verifier is authorised to request from smart-cards. As any
other ABC, an ABPKC also has selective disclosure capacity.
Therefore, a verifier can reveal its access rights adaptively
depending on use cases. For instance, it is not necessary for
a user to know that a service provider is eligible to request
the “gender” attribute, when the current application needs
information only about her age.
It is well known that the textbook Diffie–Hellman key-
exchange protocol [10] is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
attacks. The reason for that is that there is nothing that
binds the ephemeral public shares to the two parties who
intend to establish a session key. While we do not identify
cards and verifiers, we are still able to authenticate them
and their messages. Each public share is signed by selective
disclosure, that is, a non-interactive attribute-based zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge; the ABCDH protocol is
shown in Figure 2. Hereafter, we assume that a DH group
is given (e.g., Z∗p, a prime subgroup G of Z
∗
p of order q, or
points on an elliptic-curve over a finite field) and the par-
ticipants know all system parameters and they verify the
security of choices of the other party. Though we use multi-
plicative notation with a prime subgroup, the given protocol
can easily be adapted to other groups.
As in Section 2.2, we assume some underlying secure cryp-
tographic primitives, such as random oracles f1, f2, f3 (im-
plemented as a standard hash function), a symmetric-key
authenticated encryption for the secure channel, and the
ABC technology that supports selective disclosure of at-
tributes.
The verifier generates its own share xV ∈ Zq and computes
hV = g
xV (mod p). Using its ABPKC, the verifier creates a
selective disclosure proof σV = SD ((idV , Att_Acc); f1(hV ))
about its identifier idV and its attribute access rights Att_Acc.
The verifier uses f1(hV ) as the nonce to be signed by the
non-interactive proof. Finally, it sends the proof σV and the
DH public share hV to the card.
Upon receiving the verifier’s authentication and the public
share, the card checks the proof and the values, and stores
the access rights Att_Acc and the identifier idV . It generates
its own private share xC ∈ Zq and computes hC = g
xC
(mod p). The card creates an empty proof of validity using
f1(hV ‖hC ) as message to be signed by the NIZK: σC =
SD (∅; f1(hV ‖hC)). Finally, the card sends its public share
hC and the proof σC to the verifier who can verify the proof.
According to the Diffie–Hellman key exchange, both par-
ties can now calculate the seed = gxV xC . They can derive
their shared key k = f2(seed) and perform an explicit key
confirmation. The verifier and the card carry out ABC se-
lective disclosure proofs within the secure session protected
by key k. Like in ICA, nonces are transformed before they
are signed by the NIZK proofs.
Theorem 2. Assume that a Diffie–Hellmann group is set
up and known to all participants, a secure ABC technology
is given for selective disclosure with ideal revocation, and a
symmetric-key authenticated encryption is given for the se-
cure channel. Moreover, let f1, f2, f3 be random oracles with
all participants (including the adversary) having access to
them. Then the ABCDH protocol is a secure ABC session
protocol.
Although the ABCDH protocol is not as efficient as the
ICA protocol, it is worth discussing it for multiple reasons.
First, it demonstrates that on an abstract level the verifier
and the prover (the card) can be regarded in a symmetric
manner. Both of them have an ABC to prove validity—
potentially without identification—and to protect their pri-
vacy. This enables us to foresee applications that have not
been considered yet. Some examples include machine-to-
machine communication in the internet of things or ad-hoc
communication between individuals who do not trust each
other and thus wish to share as little information as possi-
ble in a given context. As devices become more powerful in
terms of memory and computation, this protocol becomes ef-
ficient. Second, the use of ABCs as a new kind of public-key
certificate provides more flexibility than the current technol-
ogy and thus it extends the possible use of PKIs.
3. CONCLUSION
Selective disclosure and flexible credential issuance (i.e.,
one based on already existing credentials) are important
mechanisms of attribute-based credentials to provide secu-
rity and privacy simultaneously. ABCs are building blocks
of future privacy-friendly electronic identity systems. This
paper shows how to build a secure channel between a verifier
and a potentially anonymous smart-card carrying ABCs in
the presence of a very powerful adversary.
First, we have described a security model to enable us to
make security proofs with standard cryptographic primitives
and assumptions. Second, we have shown two protocols that
can be analysed in this framework. One of these protocols
is more efficient, the other one can be generalised to new
scenarios in which devices (a prover and a verifier) authen-
ticate each other anonymously. Third, we have shown the
security of these protocols relying on standard assumptions.
We assumed that proper revocation mechanisms exist that
can handle abuses of ABCs. Although there exist crypto-
graphic techniques for revocation, most of them are not effi-
cient enough for smart-card implementations. Feasible and
easily applicable privacy-preserving revocation techniques
are crucial in the deployment of ABCs, but they are yet
to be developed.
Authentication has been considered as a general notion.
Rather than simply a proof of identity, authentication is a
proof that certain predicates hold for an entity. When a se-
cure channel is built on this notion of mutual authentication,
participants can be convinced that the entities at the other
end meet some requirements in terms of these predicates.
Privacy-respecting applications will need security analyses
in a similar model as the one shown in this paper. As we
mentioned, ABCDH can be the first step towards many
new such protocols.
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